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Can Supranational Infrastructure 





We study the impact of institutional characteristics of national and supranational 
regulation on the effectiveness of both types of regulation. We focus on four 
institutional dimensions: regulatory capacity, accountability, commitment and 
fiscal capacity. We show how supranational regulation may reduce or worsen the 
challenges imposed by national institutional weaknesses. The analysis allows an 
identification of the costs and benefits of supranational regulation in very diversified 
institutional contexts. It also explains why some desirable changes from a global 
welfare perspective are unlikely to take place unless the losers of market integration 
are somehow compensated when national regulation is unlikely to do so as a result 
of some of its weaknesses.
UNE RÉGULATION INTERNATIONALE DES INFRASTRUCTURES 
POUR COMPENSER LES FAIBLESSES INSTITUTIONNELLES 
NATIONALES ?
Cet article étudie l’impact des caractéristiques institutionnelles de la régulation 
nationale et internationale sur l’efficacité des deux types de régulation. Il s’intéresse 
à quatre dimensions de faiblesse institutionnelle : la capacité pratique de réguler, 
la capacité à rendre des comptes, la capacité d’engagement et la capacité fiscale. 
En identifiant les coûts et les bénéfices générés par une régulation supranationale, 
l’analyse montre que cette dernière peut soit réduire, soit amplifier, les problèmes 
posés par la faiblesse des institutions nationales. Elle montre aussi que l’intégration 
régionale du marché des infrastructures, quand elle est source d’efficacité, est 
peu susceptible de se matérialiser si la régulation nationale n’est pas capable de 
compenser les perdants des réformes du fait de ses faiblesses institutionnelles.
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INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure regulation has traditionally been conceived as a national or local 
policy. The increased scope for international trade in infrastructure services, 
observed in the last 20 years, has induced the case for their regulation at a 
supranational level. This is because, when regulated services cross borders, 
local regulatory decisions have non-local impacts. For instance, when Spain 
decided to stop subsidizing renewable energies, the price of electricity in France 
increased. When Belgium, France or Germany closes its nuclear plants, it 
impacts the electricity markets in many other countries. More broadly, without 
coordination, differences in the national regulation of infrastructure services may 
alter comparative advantages and risks allocation across countries and result in 
production and distribution location arbitrations (e.g., Crampes [2014] or Albrecht 
[2014] in the context of the EU energy policies). This can penalize both users 
and producers, as already pointed out in the fiscal federalism literature on tax or 
environmental competition (e.g., Oates [2005]). Differences in national regulation 
can also reduce the incentive for new cross-border investments, a major issue at 
a time when concerns for climate change are leading to major transformations in 
the nature and composition of the infrastructure capital stock.1
As a result of the growing policy concerns for regulatory spillovers, the academic 
literature on the interactions between regulation and international markets has 
been growing over time. But it is quite heterogeneous. It has a long record in 
political science (e.g., Eckert [2011], Majone [1997] or Thatcher [2011]) and 
among legal scholars (e.g., Sandholtz and Stone Sweet [2012]). It has also been 
implicit in the early models of multiple principals and multiples agents (Faure-
Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort [1999]; Martimort [1996a], [1996b]; Laffont and 
Martimort [1997], [1998a], [1998b], [1999], [2001]). Supranational dimensions 
of regulation only started to appear explicitly in the design of regulation in agency 
models in the mid to late 1990s. This has led to a wide range of non-standard 
results that contributed to make the case for a supranational supervision of a wide 
range of activities requiring some form of regulation.
The formal economic modeling of regulation in a supranational context 
may have started with Brainard and Martimort [1996], [1997]. They focused 
on the strategic effect of export subsidies in an integrated market under 
asymmetric information between the regulator and the national firms. Their 
result explained why there may be local tolerance for market power on behalf 
1. As argued by Von Hirshhausen et al. [2012], cross-country incomparability of regulation 
includes a wide range of very basic regulatory design characteristics such as differences in methodo- 
logies used to calculate the allowed revenue.
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of local consumers’ welfare when the related inefficiencies can be exported to 
foreign consumers. They implicitly started to point to some of the distributional 
issues supranational regulation needs to address. Combes, Caillaud and Jullien 
[1997] showed that the existence of international interactions may influence the 
optimal choice of regulatory instruments. For instance, it may be optimal to 
allow for quantity subsidies, rejecting the common criticism of state aids in less 
focused models. Calzolari [2004] looked at the interaction between the policies 
of different national regulators when they have to deal with a single multinational 
firm operating in two different countries. He shows that multinational firm can 
relatively easily benefit from a lack of coordination between the various national 
regulators, hinting already at the relevance of the weaknesses of national regulators 
when making a case for a supranational regulator. Biancini [2011] added the 
importance of a positive cost of public funds for the optimal regulation of national 
firms in a common market. She showed that, for market integration to be welfare 
improving, the fiscal costs of regulation have to be lower than the efficiency 
gains achieve through integration. She also provided arguments to temper the 
enthusiasm for supranational regulation by showing that cost correlations and 
ex ante technological risks can impact its effectiveness. Finally, Auriol and 
Biancini [2015] looked at the risks of underinvestment in costly interconnection 
when networks can cover various countries. Their results also make the case, 
in a world of benevolent national regulators with national monopolists, for a 
supranational regulator. It is needed to facilitate welfare gains from integration 
when costs differences between these monopolists are sufficiently strong.
Overall, this research showed that there are many instances in which 
supranational regulation may make sense but it also demonstrated, often 
implicitly, the relevance of institutional weaknesses for the optimal design of 
regulation. How well the unexpected effects of increased trade in infrastructure 
services in countries with different regulatory preferences and constraints can 
be addressed depends on the ability and willingness of national regulators to 
coordinate. And they occasionally allow for transitional subsidies. Moreover, 
this literature also implies that many policy interventions are easier to implement 
for a supranational agency. It is less subject to perverse incentives than the 
national agencies, which are required to coordinate multiple internal and external 
concerns. It is then a better alternative to international negotiations between 
national regulators and ministries of the various countries concerned.
This is not to say that supranational regulation is easy to implement and differences 
in regulatory preferences and institutional designs may matter. Negotiation can 
be hard and reveal differences in commitment to supranational regulation as 
a solution to the joint planning and coordination efforts. The recent debates 
surrounding the sovereignty of countries in the context of the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) signed by Canada and the European 
Union, and of the ongoing negotiation of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union and the United States, illustrate 
the tensions associated with the efforts to increase the role of supranational 
regulation when national preferences are heterogeneous.
In this context, concerns for the consequences of a de facto supra-national 
regulation defined by international arbitration courts as a substitute to national 
regulation has made the top of the agenda of many policymakers. This is what 
the public unhappiness over the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement 
clauses designed to protect international players from the risks of local institutional 
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weaknesses is all about. It highlights the possibility that national regulatory 
preferences could be superseded by regulatory rulings decided by judges 
without a credible mandate to take into account differences in preferences. The 
concerns for the possible capture of supranational judges stemming from the 
differences in budgets or technical capacity available to large operators lobbying 
the supranational agencies as compared to those available to users and other 
stakeholders illustrate some of the limitations of supranational regulation. In 
many countries, the risks of supranational regulation could thus be stronger than 
its potential payoffs.
This suggests that the regulatory challenge produced by international trade 
in infrastructure services is not only about reconciling differences in political 
preferences. It also has to rely on a conceptualization of the implementation 
challenges to identify the nature and the importance of the trade-offs. The 
institutional structures supporting supranational regulation can often be weaker 
than national structures in various ways. They depend on the commitment of 
multiple national governments or agencies to the coordination of some dimensions of 
regulatory policy. They imply multiple levels of explicit or implicit agency issues.
In this paper, we document the importance of institutional characterizations 
of national and supranational regulation (SNR). In particular, we focus on 
four institutional dimensions that tend to drive the optimal regulatory policy 
in infrastructure: regulatory capacity, accountability, commitment and fiscal 
capacity. Estache and Wren-Lewis [2009] have shown their relevance in the 
context of the optimal design of national policies. This paper highlights the 
extent to which the supranational dimensions sometimes may reduce or worsen 
the challenges imposed by national institutional weaknesses. It allows a better 
appreciation of the costs and benefits of supranational regulation in very 
diversified institutional contexts. It also explains why some changes desirable 
from a global welfare perspective are unlikely to take place unless the losers of 
market integration are compensated when national regulation is unlikely to be 
able to do so as a result of some of its weaknesses.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe the 
nature of national institutional constraints that drive regulatory outcomes in the 
contexts of a simple model of regulation in an isolated country. The third section 
then surveys the various ways in which supranational regulation may mitigate 
these problems. The fourth section considers the challenges for supranational 
regulation that these institutional limitations present, as well as the ways in which 
it may worsen them. The fifth section concludes.
SUPRANATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES
Trying to deal with the national regulatory preferences and institutional 
characteristics clearly adds to the complexity of managing information asymmetries 
in a supranational context. We rely here on a broad definition of institutional 
weaknesses. To highlight the main drivers of the optimal choice of regulation 
in a multi-country context, the key aspects of institutional weaknesses affecting 
regulation can be grouped into four broad limitations: 1) limited regulatory 
This content downloaded from 
             164.15.128.33 on Wed, 03 Feb 2021 12:52:17 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 917
Revue économique – vol. 69, n° 6, novembre 2018, p. 913-936
 Emmanuelle Auriol, Antonio Estache, Liam Wren-Lewis
capacity, 2) limited commitment ability, 3) limited accountability and 4) limited 
fiscal capacity.2 Before considering the relationship between these weaknesses 
and supranational regulation, we briefly discuss the impact of these limitations 
on standard welfare drivers at the country specific level.
In order to do so, it is useful to rely on a common basic model of utility 
regulation in which the regulator and the government are separate actors. We 
use it to highlight how the various forms of institutional weakness can impact the 
optimal choice of regulation even ignoring the supranational dimensions. This 
initial simple model is now standard in the field.3 It focuses on a monopolist 
producing a quantity q of a good for domestic consumption. Its cost function 
is C q e q F( )= −( ) −β ,  where b  is a firm-specific characteristic representing 
its underlying cost, e is an effort level that decreases the marginal cost and F 
is a fixed cost. b  represents costs that are outside of the firm’s control, such 
as factor prices or technology. The model is binary in that the firm is either 
low-cost, β β=  (occurring with probability n)  or high-cost, β β=  (occurring 
with probability 1−ν).  e is the part of the marginal cost that is controllable by 
the firm. For example, the manager may be able to reduce costs by purchasing 
from the cheapest supplier or by reducing mistakes. Exerting an effort level of 
e causes the firm a disutility of ψ e( )  ( ,′ >ψ 0  ′′ >ψ 0, ′′′ ≥ψ 0).
The monopoly’s revenue from sales is qp,  where p is the price level. In addition 
to this revenue, the monopoly receives a transfer from the government.4 This transfer 
takes the form of a lump sum, t, which may be positive (i.e., a subsidy) or negative 
(i.e., a tax). The monopoly’s profit is then U qp e q F e t= − −( ) − − ( )+β ψ .  
U is also the “rent” the firm receives from being the monopoly supplier. The monopoly 
has a participation constraint (PC) such that its rent must be no less than 0, i.e.
 U β( )≥ 0  (1)
and 
 U β( )≥ 0.  (2)
We define e β( )  and q β( )  as the effort levels and quantities produced as a 
function of b. 5 Consumers’ gross surplus from consuming a quantity q of the 
good is
 S q P q q
q
( )= ′( ) ′∫0 d ,  (3)
where P q( )  is the inverse demand function of a normal good ( ,′ >S 0  ′′ <S 0). 
Taxpayers also need to be accounted for as they pay taxes to fund the transfer to 
the monopoly. Raising an amount t in taxes costs 1+( )λ t,  where λ> 0 is the 
2. See Estache and Wren-Lewis [2009] for a justification of this classification in a national 
context.
3. See Laffont and Tirole [1993] or Armstrong and Sappington [2007] for detailed expositions 
of these models.
4. See Laffont and Tirole ([1993], p. 145-155) for details of how the model changes when 
transfers are removed. Generally, when prices must be used to generate the revenue here provided 
by transfers there will be a loss of efficiency. This may however be mitigated if the firm can use 
two-part tariffs rather than linear prices.
5. Hence e β( )  is equivalent to e,  e β( )  is equivalent to b,  etc., in the notation of Laffont and 
Tirole [1993].
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opportunity cost of public funds. Hence the net surplus of consumers plus the 
surplus of taxpayers is V S q qp t= ( )− − +( )1 λ .  It implies that if the monopoly 
can be taxed it yields a social surplus valued at 1+( )λ t.  By virtue of equation (2), 
we have that p P q S q= ( )= ′( ).  We assume that both p and q are public 
information and that the government sets one of these variables directly. The 
other is then determined by the consumer market.
We assume here that F is common knowledge. We also assume that the 
government can observe marginal cost c e= −β  but it does not observe the 
components of this cost—i.e., it does not observe b  and e. The contract between 
the government and the firm can therefore specify the price the firm should sell 
at, the marginal cost level it should obtain and the transfer from the government 
to the firm.
Suppose the government is unaware of the value of b.  From the revelation 
principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to direct revelation 
mechanisms which specify for each message from the firm, the transfer, the final 
marginal cost and the price that will occur. In order for the firm to be willing to 
accept the contract designed for its type, such a mechanism must satisfy the PCs 
in (1) and (2) as well as the incentive compatibility constraints (ICC):
 U U eβ β β( )≥ ( )+ ( )( )Φ  (4)
and
 U U eβ β β β( )≥ ( )− ( )+( )Φ ∆ .  (5)
Here ∆β β β= −  and Φ ∆e e e( )= ( )− −( )ψ ψ β ,  i.e., the difference between 
the costs of the high-type and the low-type exerting a given effort level. These ICC 
make sure that neither type of firm wishes to pretend to be the other type—i.e., 
they will reveal their type truthfully. It is useful to note that ′( )>Φ e 0,  since 
′′ >ψ 0,  i.e., the marginal cost of exerting effort at a given cost level is greater 
for the high-cost firm than the low-cost firm.
As usual, when there is an asymmetry of information so that the regulator does 
not observe the b,  the binding constraints will be the PC of the high-cost firm 
in (1) and the ICC of the low-cost firm (4). Moreover, if inequality (4) holds, 
then U β( )  is greater than U β( ),  and hence we need only to be concerned with 
ensuring U β( )≥ 0. The only potentially binding conditions are, thus, (1) and (4). 
Given that the government does not wish to give rents to the firm, both of 
these conditions will bind, since through changing the transfers to the firm the 
government can set the firm’s rents as low as possible. We therefore have that 
while the high-cost firm will receive no rent, the low-cost firm will receive a rent 
U eβ β( )= ( )( )Φ .  This is the usual firm’s “information rent,” which is received 
as a result of the firm holding more information than the government. Since this 
rent effectively comes out of public funds (either directly through subsidies or 
through reduced taxes), its net cost to society is λ βΦ e( )( ).
The national regulator is mandated by the government to cut the asymmetry 
of information by learning the value of b.  The regulator is endowed with an 
information technology that yields a private signal r that may give information 
about the firm’s cost. With probability x  the firm’s cost is revealed to the 
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regulator ( )r =β  and with probability 1−ξ  he receives no information ( ).r =Æ  
We assume that the signal the regulator receives is “hard” information. This 
means that the regulator cannot report that the firm is of a particular type unless 
it has received a signal revealing this to be true. However, it can hide information 
and report that the signal is Æ  even if this was not the case. In other words, the 
signal can be hidden but it cannot be faked.
The firm is assumed to observe both the regulator’s signal and his report to the 
government. The firm can corrupt the information process by contracting on the 
regulator’s report and make dependent transfers. Transfers between the regulator 
and the firm are costly because illegal, i.e., there may be costs undertaken to hide 
the transfer and/or a penalty if the parties are caught. Hence for any bribe given 
by the firm, the regulator only enjoys a fraction k of the bribe, where k ∈( )0 1, . 
k here represents the ease with which bribes can be made, i.e., a higher value of 
k means that there are fewer costs involved.
If the government wishes to prevent collusion from occurring, it can do so by 
paying an incentive payment of s k e= ( )( )Φ β  every time the regulator reports 
that r =β.  Since this costs society λ βk eΦ ( )( ),  it will always be optimal for the 
government to prevent collusion. Indeed the social cost of the firm’s information 
rent is λ βΦ e( )( )  and k <1.6 So preventing collusion costs λ βk eΦ ( )( )  and yields 
a benefit of λ βΦ e( )( ).
Departing, now, from the Laffont and Tirole [1993] model, we assume the 
government can be captured. Hence the non-benevolent government aims to 
maximize the following social welfare function:
 W U V= +γ ,   (6)
where 1 >1+ >λ γ , 7 with g  representing the capture of decisions. Since the 
government is the decision maker, this directly distorts its choices: it cares less 
about the distortion caused by taxes to pay for the firm’s rent, or alternatively 
if the regulated firm is profitable about the taxes that can be levied on its 
profits. Substituting in the appropriate functions and rearranging gives:
W S q pq e q e F U= ( )+ − +( ) −( ) + ( )+  − + −( )λ λ β ψ λ γ1 1 .
The government then sets quantities and effort levels to maximize expected 
welfare. In all cases, quantities will be set such that the price mark-up reflects 









1 ,   (7)
where h  is the elasticity of demand.
6. See Chapter 11 of Laffont and Tirole [1993] for further details.
7. If 1+ <λ γ  then the model becomes uninteresting as the government simply transfers all of 
consumers wealth to the firm through taxation.
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The government can also indirectly set the firm’s effort level by promising 
to reimburse an appropriate fraction of the firm’s costs. If the government is 
informed (because the regulator has truthfully reported its signal), then it will 
set effort levels to be efficient, i.e., q e= ′( )ψ .  The government achieves such 
effort levels by making the transfer to the firm independent of the firm’s cost, 
which gives the firm the efficient incentives when it comes to exerting effort.
The government will also set such an efficient effort level for the low-cost 
firm in the case where it has had to extract cost information from the firm through 
the revelation mechanism discussed earlier. However, the government will not 
set an efficient effort level for the high-cost firm. This is because, as shown 
earlier, the information rent paid to the low-cost firm is a function of the high-
cost firm’s effort, i.e., U eβ β( )= ( )( )Φ .  The government therefore reduces the 
effort exerted by the high-cost firm in order to decrease this expected rent. In 
particular, we will have
 ′ ( )( )= ( )−
+ −





1 1 Φ .  (8)
This result can be understood as follows. In the basic LT model, the optimal 
effort for the high-cost firm is obtained by setting ξ γ= = 0  in (8). The rent 
that the low-cost firm receives is costly to society since it comes through higher 
distortive taxation, and hence the government will wish to reduce it. Furthermore, 
a larger potential rent for the firm increases the size of the incentive payment the 
government pays the regulator, and hence this is a further reason to decrease the 
low-cost firm’s rent. However, when the government is captured by the industry, 
which here is represented by a positive value of g,  it is more inclined to abandon 
rents to the industry, and therefore distorts less the effort of the high-cost firm.
In order to reduce the rent, the government reduces the amount the low-cost 
firm would gain by mimicking the high-cost firm. The government does this 
by reducing the effort level it requires of the high-cost firm and the transfer it 
receives, which correspondingly reduces the output produced by the high-cost 
firm. This, therefore, reduces the number of units over which the low-cost firm 
can exercise its cost-advantage by mimicking the high-cost firm.8 When the 
level of regulatory capture, g,  increases, the distortion on the high-cost firm is 
reduced so that the rent of the low-cost firm increases.
We can now discuss the four institutional weaknesses outlined above and how 
they relate to the various variables in equation (8).
Limited regulatory capacity. In the model above, an improvement in regulatory 
capacity is simulated through a higher value of x,  the probability that the regulator 
is informed. Social welfare is increasing in x.  If it increases, the regulator is more 
likely to observe the firm’s underlying cost b.  This increases expected welfare in 
two ways. First, welfare is higher in the case where b  is observed than when it 
is not, since here there is no asymmetric information and hence the low-cost firm 
receives no information rent whilst the high-cost firm undertakes the efficient 
amount of effort. Second, even when b  isn’t observed, the government can be 
8. An alternative way to understand the result is that the transfer is reduced by an amount that 
makes the high-cost firm indifferent to the change, but it reduces the gain to the low-cost firm of 
mimicking since the marginal cost of effort is lower for the low-cost firm (i.e., ′ ( )( )>Φ e β 0).
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more confident that the firm is the high-cost type, and hence will offer a contract 
with a lower distortion for the high-cost type. This lower distortion will lead to 
more cost reduction by the high-cost type and, since the government is optimizing, 
this will outweigh the cost of the extra rent that goes to the low-cost type.
In practice, regulatory agencies are frequently underfunded, usually because 
their ability to self-finance is limited legally or because of a shortage of government 
revenue. Sometimes because funding is deliberately withheld by the government 
as a means of undermining the agency. The lack of resources prevents regulators 
from relying on suitably skilled staff or monitoring tools. Beyond the regulator 
itself, an underdeveloped auditing system and non-specialized judiciary can 
further limit implementation. The outcome is thus welfare reducing for society 
for two reasons. First, the regulator has to pay an information rent to the firm more 
frequently, which must be raised through costly taxation. Second, the government 
will reduce the efficiency of the high-cost firm further in order to reduce this rent.
Limited accountability. Limited accountability is fundamentally linked to the 
information flows between actors since it is through misuse of this information 
that much of the potential for collusion occurs. In our simple model, limited 
accountability can be expressed in at least two ways. Where accountability is 
lax, collusion between the government and various interest groups, including 
regulated firms, is more likely to occur. In the model, g  is the measure of the 
degree of government capture by the firm and this is one of the variables that can 
be used to approximate the effects of changes in the level of accountability. Social 
welfare is decreasing in g.  If g  increases as a result of an international agreement, 
the government places a higher weight on the firm’s profits than the standard 
utilitarian social welfare and its accountability to users is decreased. This leads the 
governments to offer contracts more high-powered than optimal. In particular, the 
high-cost firms will face stronger incentives to reduce their costs—this increases 
efficiency directly, but the benefit is outweighed by the need to give the low-cost 
firms a larger information rent. The net effect from an uneven distribution of 
preferences between firms and consumers, limiting the accountability to consumers 
in relative terms as a result of a trade in service agreement, is thus unclear. It 
depends on the cost characteristics of the firms.
The other variable of interest in the context of an assessment of the impact 
of supranational regulation on accountability is k since it measures the ease 
with which the firm can bribe the regulator. This variable k is likely to fall if 
supranational regulation increases the cost of bribing and social welfare is thus 
decreasing in k.9 A smaller k makes side transfers more costly, leading to two 
positive effects. First, since the regulator can’t effectively receive such a high 
bribe from the firm, the government can give a smaller transfer to the regulator 
when she reports information that damages the firm. This reduces the cost for 
society due to the cost of raising public funds l.  Second, since the cost of paying 
the regulator is λ βk eΦ ( )( ),  a decrease in k decreases the government’s motivation 
to reduce the information rent. This increases the effort exerted by the high-cost 
firm, and hence leads to a decrease in costs and hence prices.
9. For various reasons, we might feel that a model where corruption never occurs is a some-
what unsatisfactory one. However, this model can easily be adapted to include both corruption and 
anti-corruption measures.
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Limited commitment. Investment in utilities is particularly vulnerable to 
government lack of commitment because governments are always involved in their 
operation and the investment is long-lived and non-transferable. Furthermore, 
if governments cannot commit to enforce contracts, then many of the 
gains that could be reaped at the initial tendering point will be lost in future 
renegotiations. To explore this problem in the model, we can add investment 
in the following way. Suppose that, rather than b  being given completely 
exogenously, the firm can influence its value by undertaking investment I 
before b  is revealed. This investment increases the probability that the firm 
will be a low-cost type, i.e., v v I= ( )  ( ,′ >v 0  ′′ <v 0). 10 If the government 
is able to commit to reimburse a chosen level of investment then they will set 
′( )= ( )− ( )+ ( )− ( )

v I U U V V1/ ,β β β β  where V β( )  is consumers and taxpayers 
surplus. Optimal investment increases as the benefits of having a low-cost firm 
increase. However, if the government cannot commit to the firm at the investment 
stage, then the firm will only take into account its private benefits of investing. We 
will then have ′( )= ( )− ( )

v I U U1/ ,β β  confirming that the inability to commit 
will produce under-investment.
Limited fiscal capacity. It is common to observe a limited ability of 
governments to finance investment or regulation, especially so since the financial 
crisis of 2008. This is a growing concern, in particular when poverty levels are 
high and limit the users’ ability to pay for their utilities services. In the model 
above, limited fiscal capacity is captured by the variable l.  A greater value of 
l  damages social surplus from trade since the quantity produced is lower and 
the price higher, as demonstrated in equation (7). Moreover, the information rent 
paid to the firm is more costly to society and this in turn leads to larger distortion 
in effort as shown in (8).
Consumers’ surplus is decreasing in l  for two reasons. First, to mitigate 
the cost of public transfers to the regulated firm, the government will ensure 
higher prices that reduce the subsidy going to the firm, and possibly even 
to generate profits that can then be taxed. In the limit (i.e., when l  goes to 
infinity) the government behaves like a private monopoly, but with a higher cost 
function than the laissez-faire monopoly, because of the situation of asymmetric 
information. For the users of the regulated services this is worse than laissez-
faire. Second, the government will reduce the power of incentives given to the 
high-cost firm to reduce the information rent, increasing costs and hence further 
increasing prices.
It is worth noting that if the consumers’ surplus is monotone with l,  the total 
social surplus, which includes the surplus of the taxpayers is non-monotone in l. 
Indeed, Auriol and Picard [2009] shows that the total social welfare is U-shape 
in l.  It initially decreases when l  increases because for the low value of l the 
regulator put a relatively high weight on the consumers’ surplus compared to 
subsidies/taxes. When the weight l  increases public transfers become costlier 
and the regulator starts to distort prices to the detriment of consumers. This 
initially decreases the social welfare (i.e., when the weight put on consumers is 
still high enough). For the large value of l  the regulator focuses on transfers (the 
10. This component is taken from Laffont and Tirole [1993] since investment isn’t modeled 
in Laffont [2005].
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objective function is tilted towards the taxpayers). When l  increases the price 
in (7) converges to the laissez-faire monopoly price. The government becomes 
predatory and the value of the rents it extracts from the consumers is weighted 
by l. The social surplus then increases with l.
In the following section, we consider the extent to which supranational regulation 
may provide opportunities to mitigate the consequences of the various sources 
of national institutional weaknesses: excess rents (limited regulatory capacity, 
accountability or fiscal capacity), insufficient efforts (limited accountability), 
underinvestment (limited commitment) and inequity (fiscal constraints). Where 
possible, we extend the model outlined above to demonstrate where each solution 
may play a role.
OPPORTUNITIES OF SUPRANATIONAL REGULATION
One of the main hope of supranational regulation is its ability to, at least 
partially, offset the impact of the main national institutional weaknesses. It is 
important however to check its actual effect for each of the various types of 
weaknesses.
Regulatory capacity. In debates over national regulatory structure, the point 
has frequently been made that there are “economies of scale” in regulatory 
expertise. Generally, a lack of skilled human resources is likely to result in the 
creation of fewer regulatory agencies. By pooling resources, a regulator is more 
likely to be able to afford the professionals required to process the information it 
receives. Moreover, experts will be able to share their knowledge more easily. At 
the national level, this has manifested itself in the tendency for advisors to 
recommend multisector agencies in developing countries and centralized, rather 
than decentralized (i.e., local), regulation in technically challenging sectors such 
as telecommunication and electricity. This argument can readily be extended 
to supranational regulation (see Kessides, Noll and Benjamin [2010], for 
example). Whilst undertaking all regulation at the regional level is likely to be 
unrealistic, a regional regulator may be the best place to assign the most technically 
complex tasks. Another mechanism may be to simply use regional bodies as a 
means to develop informal or formal networks amongst national regulators to 
share experiences. This is now quite common in all infrastructure sectors.
As for the difficulty in obtaining information from the regulated firm(s) 
when capacity is limited, a supranational regulator may help in coordinating 
this information across countries, possibly through a formal benchmarking 
process. This may create a sort of yardstick competition, whereby national 
regulators can assess the performance of the firm(s) they regulate in light of the 
information they have received from other regulated firms in other countries. This 
use of correlation between information across countries can hence be used to 
mitigate a lack of regulatory capacity whether national firms compete directly 
or otherwise.11 For example, suppose that there are two countries (A and B) 
11. Laffont and N’Guessan [1999] for example model competition as an increase in x,  while 
Laffont and Pouyet [2004] consider there likely to be informational externalities between regions.
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that regulate domestic firms according to the model described in the previous 
section. Moreover, suppose that bA  and bB  are perfectly correlated but xA 
and xB  are independent. If the regulators share information (either amongst 
themselves or via a supranational regulator), then the probability of them being 
informed is now 1 1 1− −( ) −( )= + −ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ ξA B A B A B ,  which is greater than both 
xA  and xB .  As discussed above, a higher value of x  is equivalent to an increase 
in regulatory capacity, and hence improves social welfare in both countries.
To implement some form of yardstick competition at the regional/international 
level requires that the technologies used in the different countries included to build 
the benchmark are comparable. A way in which supranational regulators may 
help mitigate national lack of regulatory capacity is through the use of common 
standards. As suggested by Auriol and Benaim [2000] when they looked at 
standardization in decentralized economies, centralized intervention is useful when 
decentralized decision units display aversion to incompatibility. Their results, 
however, point to a limitation of the use of top-down standardization. Indeed, in 
cases of tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility, decentralized standard choices 
are often optimal. Global welfare might be lower in this case with common 
standards imposed by a supranational agency, as bureaucracies are unlikely to 
pick the best standard. To reap the informational benefit of the existence of 
common standards, the supranational agency should push/help at the industry 
level for standards harmonization, rather than directly setting them.
Accountability. One argument put forward by the literature on federalism on the 
payoff to decentralization in terms of accountability is that centralized regulation 
diminishes the lobbying power of local firms.12 This may be because firms find 
coordinating on capture more difficult in a less concentrated market. Furthermore, 
Boehm and Olaya [2006] argue that regulation at the local level is likely to 
lead to more frequent interactions, encouraging capture. It is easy to extend 
this logic to the case of supranational regulation and argue that national firms 
will find capturing a regional regulator more difficult than capturing national 
regulators. To see this in the model above, let us suppose that gi ,  the degree 
to which the government values a firm’s profits, is a function of the amount of 
lobbying/bribing that the firm undertakes. In particular, suppose γ γi ib= ( ), 
where bi  is the cost to the firm of lobbying, which is chosen by the firm, and γ .( ) 
is increasing and concave. As we saw above, the firm’s expected rent Ui iγ( ) 
is increasing in gi ,  since a higher level of capture results in the government 
reducing the firm’s potential rent loss. Hence, if there is national regulation, the 
firm will choose a level of lobbying such that:
 γ γi i i i ib U b′ ( ) ′ ( )( )=1.  (9)
We assume that the LHS of this equation is decreasing and takes a value greater 
than 1 when bi = 0  in order to have a unique level of capture in equilibrium.
Now suppose that regulation is undertaken at the supranational level where 
there are N countries (and hence N firms). Assuming that the countries are 
identical and that the supranational regulator values them equally, he will optimize 
the following social welfare function:
12. See, for example, Bardhan and Mookherjee [2006] or Trillas [2010b].
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symmetric, in equilibrium γ γi j=  for all i j, .  Hence we arrive at the solution 
′( ) ′ ( )( )=γ γb b NUi .  Comparing this with equation (9) suggests that the amount 
of lobbying each firm does is much lower as the LHS in (9) is decreasing (since 
both γ .( )  and Ui .( )  are increasing and concave). This is because each firm 
attempts to free-ride on other firm’s lobbying, and does not take into account 
the benefit that lobbying has on other firms. Of course, this assumes that firms 
cannot collude with other—if so, there would be no such free-riding. Indeed, 
market integration can sometimes provoke firm exit, producing concentrated 
markets where collusion is a threat.
A second way in which the case for a supranational agency can be made stems 
from the payoffs associated with an increase in the number of agencies. Consider 
the regulatory need to retrieve information on firms’ performance. Since this is often 
at the base of how much the firm is allowed to charge or how much it is subsidized, 
firms have a strong incentive to bribe regulators into keeping this information hidden.
However, Laffont and Martimort [1999] show that this risk can be mitigated 
if information is collected by more than one agency, since each regulator may 
ignore the externality it imposes on the others by revealing this information. To 
see this effect in our model, suppose that in place of there being one technology 
that may reveal the costs of the firm, there are two— r1  and r2 —with the stochastic 
structure of the signals given by:
ξ β11 1 2= = =( )P r r ,
ξ β12 1 2= = =∅( )P andr r ,
ξ β21 1 2= =∅ =( )P andr r ,
ξ22 1 2= = =∅( )P r r .
The case where both technologies are operated by a single regulator is 
equivalent to the model above with ξ ξ ξ ξ= + +11 12 21.  As we have shown, in 
order to prevent collusion in this case the government will be required to give an 
incentive payment of k eΦ β( )( )  with probability v vξ ξ ξ ξ= + +( )11 12 21 .  Now 
suppose that two different regulators collect these two signals. If each regulator is 
unaware of the signal the other receives and if they cannot collude with each other, 
in equilibrium, each regulator expects the other to report their signal truthfully.13 
13. This model is from Chapter 8 of Laffont [2005]. Of course, limited accountability is also 
likely to make inter-agency collusion more probable. See Laffont and Meleu [1997] for an analysis.
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In this type of contract, the government asks each regulator to announce the two 
signals r1  and r2.  Consider a potential collusion-proof equilibrium where each 
regulator reports truthfully the signal. If both regulators receive informative 
signals, then they will each be unable to collude with the firm, since the firm 
will anticipate the other will tell the truth and hence be unwilling to pay any 
bribe. Therefore, the government just needs to give incentive payments to the 
regulatory agencies when only one reports an informative signal. In particular, it 
will pay k eΦ β( )( )  to agency i if ri = β  and rj =∅.  Since this only occurs with 
probability v ξ ξ12 21+( )  the cost of collusion has been reduced.14
Overall, the model shows that two regulators collecting the information may 
be better than one, since when both are informed they each ignore the externality 
they effect on the other by revealing the information. Moreover, Estache and 
Martimort [2000] argue that, if different supervisors are instead not aware of the 
information the other receives, separation is still likely to reduce capture. Since 
each supervisor is now only partially informed, their ability to extract bribes 
from the firm is reduced.
If the supranational regulator is restricted to only obtain information on the 
efficiency of the national regulators, it may still improve accountability but through a 
different mechanism. By demanding that national regulators produce information 
on their actions, the supranational regulator can act for transparency. This is 
another form of yardstick competition, applied at the regulators actions. If citizens 
and governments can compare the performance of their regulator with that of 
other countries, their national regulators may be made accountable. In the model 
above, for example, information on v  or x  on neighboring countries may make 
it harder for the regulator to hide information over the long term.
Commitment. In theory, short termism in regulation implementation linked to 
local political cycles may be easier to minimize with an independent supranational 
regulatory structure. In particular, it may be easier to ensure the independence of 
a supranational regulator, a solution to problems of commitment that is commonly 
advised by regulatory practitioners. One possible reason that independent 
regulation may increase commitment is that the regulator and the government 
may hold different objective functions. If the regulator is biased towards the firm 
( )γ>1  and is given control over regulatory policy, this regulator will then be less 
keen to renegotiate than the government since he will care less about impacting 
the firm’s profit one way or another beyond the established rules of the game as 
defined by regulation. A regulator with this objective function is likely to make 
investment decision easier, as risks levels will be lower and incentives will be 
more powerful. This means U Uβ β( )− ( )  will be larger in the basic model.
We can apply exactly the same logic to the creation of a supranational 
regulatory agency. Indeed, one might even consider the possibility of choosing 
the regulator’s objective in such a way more reasonable with a supranational body, 
since they are perhaps less likely to be career civil servants or political appointees 
with political concerns and instead be industry professionals who have greater 
concerns for their professional reputation. This is roughly the implicit argument 
14. See Chapter 8 of Laffont [2005], which is based on Laffont and Meleu [2001], for further 
comparative statics. Linked to this idea is the effect decentralization has on collusion, which is 
considered in Laffont and Pouyet [2004].
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built in the adoption of international arbitration courts for instance. It has also 
been used in the discussions of the growth of the supranational regulatory state 
in Europe.15
Second, regardless of its objective function, the creation of a supranational 
regulator may provide an extra veto in regulatory decisions. Levy and Spiller 
[1994], [1996] argue that the ability of a system to commit to time inconsistent 
regulatory policies depends on the number of independent actors required to 
change a decision. Generally, a separation of powers improves commitment 
because future renegotiation is more costly when there are many non-cooperating 
principals that have to agree to a renegotiation.16 As argued by Kessides, Noll 
and Benjamin [2010], “internationalization of regulation creates institutions 
that can be changed only by mutual agreement among several nations so that 
political change in one nation is insufficient to cause a radical change in regulatory 
accountability unless a new government is willing to sacrifice all of the other 
benefits that arise from regional economic cooperation.” The set up cost is the 
toughest challenge in this view of the world.
Even if a supranational agency does not have the potential to veto a renegotiation, 
it may still be able to improve commitment when it can function as a referee. Its 
position as an international actor who is likely to be relatively well informed 
places it in a good position to be involved in any disputes between countries or 
firms. The literature on incomplete contracts suggests that efficiency may be 
retained even when commitment is not possible if the parties can at least fix ex ante 
their respective bargaining powers and default positions for future renegotiations.17 
In regulatory contracts, this is usually achieved through an arbitration process 
managed by an expert panel. The ideal situation is to mandate a regional rather 
than a national bias in the evaluations. But this is, of course, quite politically 
sensitive.
Fiscal capacity. One of the main aims of processes such as the integration 
of electricity markets is to take advantage of economies of scale. Supranational 
regulation may define the coordination between countries and reduce the 
potentially inefficient duplication of infrastructure that would occur if countries 
acted independently. A direct fiscal payoff should be a mitigation of fiscal 
constraints for governments, since they can undertake more efficient investment 
in infrastructure. This is particularly the case for regional public goods 
aggregated under a “best-shot” technology, such as ports, airport hubs or major 
telecommunications cables.18 In our simple model, this means that each firm 
paid a fixed cost F as part of its cost function. Hence, even if the two firms were 
identical, less public funds would be spent if one country purchased its electricity 
from the other and shut down production in its own country.
In a similar way, the integration of regional infrastructure regionalization 
may rebalance investments such that countries invest more efficiently through 
comparative advantage. Electricity integration, for example, may enable 
15. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet [2012] argue that in policy areas dealing with high levels of 
cross-border transactions, there is a greater supply of EU-level rules. They also point out that this 
was matched by an increase in the number of related interest groups based in Brussels.
16. Olsen and Torsvik [1993] and Martimort [1999a], [1999b] give models showing that oppor-
tunistic renegotiation is decreased when there are several regulators.
17. See, for example, Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994].
18. See Sandler [2004] for a definition of various types of aggregator.
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investment in electricity generation to be focused in those countries that have 
the greatest returns. In the model above, this might occur for example when 
β βA =  and β βB = ,  since in this case Country B would prefer to import from 
Country A. This then frees up fiscal space in other countries to invest in domestic 
transmission and distribution networks (see Auriol and Biancini [2015]).
Finally, the creation of supranational regulation may create opportunities for 
new funding instruments that may direct extra financing into the infrastructure 
sector. Though donors have taken time to adapt to funding regional, rather than 
national projects, they are increasingly seeing funding regional public goods as 
part of their remit. In the long term, donors are likely to see several advantages 
in lending to a regional organization which, as outlined above, may not be 
subject to the similar problems of capacity, commitment and accountability that 
plague national institutions. Indeed, as regional organizations become more 
developed, the advantages outlined above may help to encourage further private 
financing. This potential combination of extra donor resources and private finance 
would then help to improve fiscal capacity.
WHY SUPRANATIONAL REGULATION IS NOT ALWAYS 
AN IMPROVEMENT
This section focuses on the possible risks associated with the decision to rely 
on supranational regulation when national institutions are weak. Supranational 
regulators themselves may indeed be constrained as a result of weaknesses in 
national institutions. In many cases, supranational regulation may actually 
inflate the consequences of the national institutional weakness. The following 
explains how this can happen for each of the four types of institutional weaknesses 
discussed so far.
Limited regulatory capacity. When national regulators do not have sufficient 
capacity to extract information from the monopoly they regulate and use such 
information efficiently, international competition amongst regulated firms managed 
at the supranational level might help close the information gaps as discussed in the 
third section. However, the introduction of international competition adds new 
layers of complexity to the task of regulation.19 For instance, the supranational 
regulator may be involved in reducing market power and setting access prices, 
which are far from straightforward issues.
In the electricity or telecoms sectors, market power can significantly undermine 
the benefits of competition. For instance, Bunn and Zachmann [2010] show 
that international interconnection of electricity networks may reduce consumer 
welfare if a dominant domestic firm can use the interconnection to exercise its 
market power. Theoretically, the regulator may be able to counter such market 
power through using access prices to subsidize firms that have relatively little 
market power (Laffont [2005]). However, the complexity involved in calculating 
19. This echoes the Williamsionian notion of “selective intervention” in the theory of the firm 
(Williamson [1985]), which offers a way to understand how a bigger organization fails to replicate 
what more decentralized ones reach.
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market power is high, and hence allowing such subsidies when capacity is low 
may give the regulator too much discretion that may then be misused.20 In a 
developing country context, a further worry of creating supranational regulatory 
agencies is that it may spread the little regulatory capacity that exists in the region 
even more thinly. This emphasizes the danger of using the logic outlined in the 
previous section that draws parallels from the decentralization/centralization 
debate. Clearly replacing national regulators with a single central regulator 
would take advantage of the increasing returns to scale in expertise, but such 
replacement is likely to be impossible in a context where national sovereignty is 
at stake. National governments are likely to be unwilling to significantly trim 
their national regulatory agencies, and hence increases in regulatory capacity 
at the supranational level may entail decreases in national regulatory capacity.
A more general problem may arise from specific design of information 
gathering processes. In the many instances in which information is collected at 
a national or more local level, transferring regulatory capacity to supranational 
regulators may interfere. Additional incentive issues may arise. For instance, 
if national regulators remain responsible for producing information but delegate 
some decision making to the supranational regulator, this may decrease their 
incentive to retrieve reliable information. Since information flows are so crucial 
in the regulatory process, such incentives need to be considered when capacity 
is limited.
To see this effect in the model above, suppose that the probability the regulator 
is informed xi  is a function of effort exerted at a national level at a cost zi ,  i.e., 
ξ ξi iz= ( ),  with ′( )>ξ zi 0,  ′′( )<ξ zi 0.  To keep things simple, suppose that 
there is no capture and hence the rent that the firm receives does not depend 
on xi .  In this case, the regulator chooses zi  to reduce the expected rent paid 
to the firm, U v zi1 1−( ) − ( )( )ξ .  Hence, it  will choose zN  to be such that 
− −( ) ′( )=U v zN1 1ξ .  Now suppose that information is shared with another 
regulator in the way described in the previous section. In this case, the expected 
rent to be paid is U v z zi j1 1 1−( ) − ( )( ) − ( )( )ξ ξ .  Hence each regulator will chose a 
value of zi  that solves the equation − −( ) ′( ) − ( )( )=U v z zS S1 1 1ξ ξ .  It is therefore 
clear that less information is gathered when information is shared, z zS N< ,  and 
hence it may even be the case that the overall probability of being informed falls.
Limited accountability. As mentioned earlier, at the national level, one solution 
to the risk of capture is to involve multiple principals with conflicting aims in 
order to counter the ability of any individual principal to capture the regulator. An 
example sometimes advocated by practitioners is to include both the executive and 
the legislative branches in the regulator’s appointment and to involve actors such 
as the judiciary in any appeals process.21 At the supranational level, however, a 
lack of effective supranational legislature or judiciary may present risks on those 
occasions when differences between national executives do not provide sufficient 
accountability. This risk is likely to be particularly great when a minority of 
20. One way around this problem would be to create closer links between regulatory agencies 
and anti-trust agencies when these exist.
21. For other models describing the risks and benefits of multiple principals, see, for example, 
Martimort [1996a], [1996b].
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countries has a large sway over the decisions of the supranational regulator, as is 
likely to be the case when countries sizes are very heterogeneous. Furthermore, 
an extension of models used to analyze decentralization (e.g., Seabright [1996]) 
would argue that governments are more accountable at the national levels since 
supranational agencies usually do not face electoral pressure for policy in a 
particular country. Similarly, we may worry that any supranational body will 
be relatively unresponsive to the concerns of any particular country, reducing 
accountability.
The transfer of power to the supranational level may also worsen the 
accountability of national regulators. If it is unclear who is responsible for 
particular regulatory decisions, then it is harder for citizens to exert pressure 
at the appropriate level (Sand-Zantman [2004]). The risk is that governments 
or regulatory agencies can blame performance failures on supranational policy 
and in so doing decrease the accountability of national bodies. It is therefore 
very important that the division of powers between national and supranational 
regulators is as clear and simple as possible.
A further way in which supranational agencies may fail is when national 
regulators collude with the national firm by hiding information from a supranational 
regulator or pushing for decisions that favor the national firm over consumers. This 
is because the national government has an incentive to increase the market share 
of domestic firms since they provide jobs and tax revenue—an incentive that is 
likely to be even stronger if institutional limitations already encourage capture.22
In the model above for example, suppose that two identical countries regulate 
a single firm, such that if the firm receives an information rent (whether through 
transfers or prices), it is split evenly between the two countries budgets. Moreover, 
suppose that profits are not split evenly between the two countries, but that a 
disproportionate share α>1 2/  of the firm’s profits accrue in Country A. Then 
if α λ> +( )1 2/ ,  Country A would actually favor the firm receiving an 
information rent, and will hence collude with the firm to hide information from 
any regulator. More generally, there may clearly be conflicts of interest between 
countries when regulators set Ramsey markups, since costs and benefits are 
unlikely to be shared evenly. In the EU, Glachant and Lévêque [2009] document 
how promotion of the interests of national champions has limited the extent of 
market integration in Europe in the electricity sector. Auriol and Biancini [2015] 
propose a theoretical analysis of this problem. Since market integration in power 
industry is imperfect (i.e., it is neither political, nor fiscal), governments focus on 
their own national welfare and are biased in favor of their national (often partially 
public) firms. In the absence of legitimate supranational regulation, the countries’ 
competition for market share limits the benefit of integration and prevents 
them from efficiently using the stock of existing infrastructure. Due to these 
coordination losses, the difference in countries’ generation costs must be large 
enough for a regional power pool to enhance welfare. Cost complementarities 
in generation are indeed the main engine of integration in electricity markets.
Limited commitment. Since optimal regulatory policy is often time inconsistent, 
commitment needs to be achieved through institutions that constrain actors 
from behaving opportunistically. As argued by Levy and Spiller [1996], the 
22. Such problems are tackled in the context of decentralization in Bardhan and Mookherjee 
[2006].
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optimal institutional setup to do this is likely to be different across countries and 
a regulatory process that increases commitment must be compatible with the 
country’s institutional structure. An independent regulatory agency will work less 
well in a country where there is little tradition of bureaucratic autonomy. Here, 
if the legislator is fairly independent of the executive, specific legislation may 
instead increase commitment.
Heterogeneity across countries in the optimal institutional setup is likely to pose 
additional problems when we move to the supranational level. As discussed in 
the literature on federalism, centralization is likely to result in more homogeneity 
across localities (Oates [2005]). This can be seen in the case of regionalization 
of infrastructure, where often supranational institutions encourage a particular 
market structure or regulatory system. The British regulatory agency model has, 
for instance, largely inspired many of the institutional recommendations made at 
the EU level and inspired many of the EU level agencies. If supranational bodies 
encourage uniformity in national regulatory structures, then this is likely to worsen 
problems of limited commitment in those countries where such a structure is 
unsuitable. This effect may therefore undermine the potentially positive effects 
of market integration on commitment previously discussed.
Even if countries are fairly homogenous, the move to supranational regulation 
is likely to cause changes that may require contracts (explicit or implicit) to be 
renegotiated. Opening up such negotiation may invalidate previous commitments 
that have been made on topics such as price levels. This may then provide and 
prove an opportunity for either the government or the firm to take advantage, 
depending on who has greatest bargaining power. For example, if international 
competition is to be introduced, this will almost certainly require a renegotiation 
of price caps or subsidies. It is therefore crucial when thinking about moving 
to a supranational framework that policy makers bear in mind that the optimal 
form of regionalization is unlikely to be that which would be chosen were all 
participating countries starting from scratch.
The creation of supranational agencies may also worsen commitment problems 
if they had previously been solved through mechanisms that are not replicated 
at the supranational level. For example, an independent regulatory agency may 
improve commitment through having a sufficiently pro-industry bias, perhaps as 
the result of domestic lobbying or the revolving door.23 Alternatively, as argued 
by Trillas [2010a], [2010b], more local regulators may use regulatory policy to 
achieve other objectives that as a side effect increases commitment. For example, 
if national regulators are concerned about the profits of national firms because 
shareholders are based domestically, then this may give them an incentive to 
reward investment, while a supranational regulator might not reward it. Both of 
these examples would lead to an increase in g  that, as shown previously, may 
work as an aid to mitigating the commitment problem.
There are therefore several reasons why regionalization of infrastructure and its 
regulation may worsen problems of commitment. Moreover, limited commitment 
may significantly impact upon the success of supranational regulation. As 
Estevadeordal, Frantz and Nguyen [2004] point out, regional goods require 
23. See for instance Evans, Levine and Trillas [2008] for models in this category. Victor and 
Heller [2007] argue that in practice limited commitment has led to the rise of “dual firms” that mitigate 
a lack of commitment by keeping close ties to the public sector.
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countries to commit to providing them simultaneously. If countries’ ability to 
commit is limited, there may be a temptation at a later point to free ride.24 If 
countries cannot commit to financing and supporting supranational regulation in 
the future, this is likely to undermine a supranational regulators ability to carry 
out long-term reforms.
Limited commitment will also have implications for international trade in 
infrastructure. For example, Wren-Lewis [2010] shows that, when long-term 
commitment to trade is not possible, countries will under-invest in sectors that 
make them dependent on trade, e.g., potential electricity exporters will under-invest 
in generation whilst potential importers under-invest in distribution. Similarly, 
Auriol and Biancini [2015] show that there is a major risk of underinvestment in 
infrastructures constituting a public good, such as interconnection or transportation 
facilities, in power market integration in developing countries. In the absence 
of a strong commitment mechanism between the different countries willing to 
constitute a power pool, the investment level in the public good components of 
the network is always suboptimal. Free-riding behavior reduces incentives to 
invest, and business stealing reduces the capacity to finance new investment, 
especially in the importing country.
Limited fiscal capacity. Supranational projects often rely on supranational 
agencies for funding (e.g., the European Investment Bank and all the development 
banks). These agencies can help to improve the project credit ratings and hence 
encourage private investors to fund the project. So far, the track record of these 
agencies in financing these projects is mixed and relatively little private funding 
goes to these projects.25 Many of the projects ultimately end up relying on 
national funding which is often constrained and reliant on highly distortionary 
taxes. Supranational sponsorship certainly buys time and spread costs over time, 
but it does not solve the core issue of the failure to meet the participation constraints 
for many, if not most, of the socially desirable multi-country projects. When the 
fiscal constraints are binding, as argued in Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey [2000], it 
may be optimal to rely on international cross-subsidies. But this has also proven 
to be quite politically sensitive in many parts of the world, providing evidence of 
the limited ability of supranational regulation to deliver on the financing side. And 
having to do so in an open world with many privatized firms with complex cross-
ownership structures does not make this any easier.
International competition may actually make this more difficult as it may also 
encourage governments to promote national champions. A direct result may be 
that countries subsidize (or under-tax) domestic firms in order for them to gain 
competitive advantage. As shown by Biancini [2011], when fiscal inefficiency 
is high, this may mean international competition overall decreases welfare. For 
example, suppose we have linear demand in both countries, such that q d p= − . 
In this case, without international competition, firms in both countries produce 
such that







24. This will be particularly problematic for public goods that use a summation aggregator—see 
Sandler [2006] for a discussion of the various types of aggregator.
25. Most of the supranational projects are new infrastructure assets (“greenfield”) which involve 
construction before revenues are established and private institutional investors tend to prefer low-risk 
infrastructure projects already operating and generating revenue and profits (“brownfield”).
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However, now suppose that two national companies can enter each other’s 
market and compete in quantities (i.e., Cournot-style competition). If the two 
countries are symmetric, then in equilibrium no trade takes place. However, as 
shown by Biancini [2011], quantities will be set according to the equation







Comparing this equation to (11), we can see that the quantity produced is higher 
as a result of competition. This is due to the “business-stealing” effect of each 
country wishing to favour their own firm, and prevent the other firm from entering 
their market. Such an effect reduces welfare, since the extra quantity produced 
is not worth the extra government funding required to produce it. Moreover, 
Biancini [2011] also finds that the welfare loss is increasing in the level of fiscal 
inefficiency. Supranational regulation may find it difficult to prevent such 
behavior since there are many legitimate reasons for governments to subsidize 
and tax differently firms in infrastructure sectors.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, as for so many policy issues, there is enough evidence to be able to 
argue that there are both benefits and costs associated with the decision to rely on 
supranational regulation as a complement or substitute to national regulation. The 
current optimistic bias in favor of supranational regulation needs to be toned down 
to account for limitations predicted by both experience and theory.
The ability of supranational regulators to design, implement and enforce 
rules, and processes that support the rules, is strongly constrained by national 
institutional limitations. There are many instances in which relying on a 
supranational agency will help minimize or offset the negative consequences 
of institutional weaknesses. These have been used quite extensively to justify a 
wide range of new institutions (e.g., European regulatory agencies) or contractual 
arrangements (international dispute settlement courts). But the failures of many 
of these solutions should not come as a surprise. Conceptually, there are indeed 
just as many predictable situations in which these supranational institutions are 
likely to fail to mitigate undesirable outcomes, including some in which they 
will make things worse.
The creation of a new institution is unlikely to erase institutional weaknesses 
when there is so much heterogeneity in preferences, skills, political credibility and 
transparency among countries expected to work with each other on multi-countries 
projects and policies. Modeling these differences demonstrates that the risks 
of mis-targeting regulatory decisions are more predictable than politicians and 
bureaucrats are sometimes willing to consider. And there is plenty of empirical 
evidence of failed contracts, of underinvestment or overinvestment in international 
trade in services validating the case to moderate the excesses of enthusiasm 
for supranational regulation as an all-purpose solution to national institutional 
weaknesses or differences.
This content downloaded from 
             164.15.128.33 on Wed, 03 Feb 2021 12:52:17 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Revue économique
934
Revue économique – vol. 69, n° 6, novembre 2018, p. 913-936
REFERENCES
aGhion, P., dEWatriPont, M. and rEy, P. [1994]. “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable 
Information,” Econometrica, 62 (2): 257–282.
albrEcht, J. [2014]. “Do European Climate and Energy Policies Threaten to Postpone 
the Energy Transition?” In EstachE, A. (ed.). The Next Generation of Economic Issues 
in Energy Policy in Europe. London: CEPR Press, p. 45–64.
arMstronG, M. and saPPinGton, d. E. M. [2007]. “Recent Developments in the Theory 
of Regulation.” In arMstronG, M. and PortEr R. (eds). Handbook of Industrial 
Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, vol. 3, p. 1557–1700.
auriol, E. and bEnaiM, M. [2000]. “Standardization in Decentralized Economies,” The 
American Economic Review, 90 (3): 550–570.
auriol, E. and biancini, s. [2015]. “Powering Up Developing Countries through 
Integration?,” World Bank Economic Review, 29 (1): 1–40.
auriol, E. and Picard, P. [2009]. “Infrastructure and Public Utilities Privatization in 
Developing Countries,” World Bank Economic Review, 23 (1): 77–100.
bardhan, P. K. and MooKhErJEE, d. [2006]. “Decentralisation and Accountability in 
Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries,” The Economic Journal, 116 (508): 
101–127.
biancini, s. [2011]. “Market Integration with Regulated National Champions: Winners, 
Losers, and Cooperation.” In GolliEr, C., falcK, O. and WoEssMann, L. (eds). Industrial 
Policy for National Champions. Cambridge (Mass.), The MIT Press, p. 155–176.
boEhM, f. and olaya, J. [2006]. “Corruption in Public Contracting Auctions: The Role 
of Transparency in Bidding Processes,” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 
77 (4): 431–452.
brainard, s. l. and MartiMort, d. [1996]. “Strategic Trade Policy Design with 
Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 63 (1): 
81–105.
brainard, s. l. and MartiMort, d. [1997]. “Strategic Trade Policy with Incompletely 
Informed Policymakers,” Journal of International Economics, 42 (1): 33–65.
bunn, d. and ZachMann, G. [2010]. “Inefficient Arbitrage in Inter-Regional Electricity 
Transmission,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 37 (3): 243–265.
calZolari, G. [2004]. “Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises,” International 
Economic Review, 45 (1): 257–282.
coMbEs, P. P., caillaud, b. and JulliEn, b. [1997]. “Common Market with Regulated 
Firms,” Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, 47: 65–99.
craMPEs, c. [2014], “The EU’s ‘Three 20s:’ Environmental or Industrial Policy?” In 
EstachE, A. (ed.). The Next Generation of Economic Issues in Energy Policy in 
Europe. London: CEPR Press, p. 15–44.
EcKErt, s. [2011]. “European Regulatory Governance.” In lEvi-faur, D. (ed.). Handbook 
of the Politics of Regulation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 513–524.
EstachE, a. and MartiMort, d. [2000]. “Transactions Costs, Politics, Regulatory 
Institutions, and Regulatory Outcomes.” In ManZEtti, L. (ed.). Regulatory Policy 
in Latin America: Post-Privatization Realities. Coral Gables: North-South Center 
Press, p. 49–82.
EstachE, a. and WrEn-lEWis, l. [2009]. “Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing 
Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont’s Lead,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
47 (3): 729–770.
EstEvadEordal, a., frantZ, b. and nGuyEn, t. r. (eds) [2004]. Regional Public Goods: 
From Theory to Practice. Washington (D. C.): Inter-American Development Bank.
Evans, J., lEvinE, P. and trillas, f. [2008]. “Lobbies, Delegation and the Under-
Investment Problem in Regulation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
26 (1): 17–40.
faurE-GriMaud, a., laffont, J.-J. and MartiMort, d. [1999]. “The Endogenous 
Transaction Costs of Delegated Auditing,” European Economic Review, 43 (4-6): 
1039–1048.
This content downloaded from 
             164.15.128.33 on Wed, 03 Feb 2021 12:52:17 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 935
Revue économique – vol. 69, n° 6, novembre 2018, p. 913-936
 Emmanuelle Auriol, Antonio Estache, Liam Wren-Lewis
GasMi, f., laffont, J.-J. and sharKEy, W. [2000]. “Competition, Universal Service and 
Telecommunications Policy in Developing Countries,” Information Economics and 
Policy, 12 (3): 221–248.
Glachant, J.-M. and lévêquE, f. [2009]. Electricity Reform in Europe: Towards a Single 
Energy Market. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
KEssidEs, i. n., noll, r. G. and bEnJaMin, n. c. [2010]. “Regionalizing Reform in West 
Africa”, World Economics, 11 (3): 79–108.
laffont, J.-J. [2005]. Regulation and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
laffont, J.-J. and MartiMort, d. [1997]. “Collusion under Asymmetric Information,” 
Econometrica, 65 (4): 875–911.
laffont, J.-J. and MartiMort, d. [1998a]. “Collusion and Delegation,” RAND Journal 
of Economics, 29 (2): 280–305.
laffont, J.-J. and MartiMort, d. [1998b]. “Transaction Costs, Institutional Design and 
the Separation of Powers,” European Economic Review, 42 (3-5): 673–684.
laffont, J.-J. and MartiMort, d. [1999]. “Separation of Regulators against Collusive 
Behavior,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2): 232–262.
laffont, J.-J. and MartiMort, d. [2001]. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent 
Model. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
laffont, J.-J. and MElEu, M. [2001]. “Separation of Powers and Development,” Journal 
of Development Economics, 64 (1): 129-145.
laffont, J.-J. and MElEu, M. [1997]. “Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and 
Organizational Design,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99 (4): 519-540.
laffont, J.-J. and n’GuEssan, t. [1999]. “Competition and Corruption in an Agency 
Relationship,” Journal of Development Economics, 60: 271–295.
laffont, J.-J. and PouyEt, J. [2004]. “The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation,” Journal of 
Public Economics, 88 (1-2): 255–283.
laffont, J.-J. and tirolE, J. [1993]. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and 
Regulation. Cambridge (Mass.): The MIT Press.
lEvy, b. and sPillEr, P. t. [1994]. “The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation,” Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization, 10 (2): 201-246.
lEvy, b. and sPillEr, P. t. [1996]. Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: 
Comparative Studies of Telecommunications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MaJonE, G. [1997]. “The New European Agencies: Regulation by Information”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 4 (2): 262–275.
MartiMort, d. [1996a]. “Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals 
Incentive Theory,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 27 (1): 1–31.
MartiMort, d. [1996b]. “The Multiprincipal Nature of Government,” European Economic 
Review, 40 (3-5): 673–685.
MartiMort, d. [1999a]. “Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 88 (2): 261–293.
MartiMort, d. [1999b]. “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and 
Transaction Costs,” Review of Economic Studies, 66 (4): 929–947.
oatEs, W. E. [2005]. “Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism,” 
International Tax and Public Finance, 12: 349–373.
olsEn, t. E. and torsviK, G. [1993]. “The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications 
for Regulation and Privatization,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9 (1): 
136–158.
sandholtZ, W. and stonE sWEEt, a. [2012]. “Neo-Functionalism and Supranational 
Governance.” In JonEs, E., MEnon, A. and WEathErill, S. (eds). The Oxford Handbook 
of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 18–33.
sandlEr, t. [2004]. “Demand and Institutions for Regional Public Goods.” In 
EstEvadEordal, A., frantZ, B. and nGuyEn, T. R. (eds). Regional Public Goods: From 
Theory to Practice. Washington (D. C.): Inter-American Development Bank, p. 11–30.
This content downloaded from 
             164.15.128.33 on Wed, 03 Feb 2021 12:52:17 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Revue économique
936
Revue économique – vol. 69, n° 6, novembre 2018, p. 913-936
sandlEr, t. [2006]. “Regional Public Goods and International Organizations,” The Review 
of International Organizations, 1 (1): 5–25.
sand-ZantMan, W. [2004]. “Economic Integration and Political Accountability,” 
European Economic Review, 48 (5): 1001–1025.
sEabriGht, P. [1996]. “Accountability  and Decentralisation in Government: An Incomplete 
Contracts Model,” European Economic Review, 40 (1): 61–89.
thatchEr, M. [2011]. “The Creation of European Regulatory Agencies and Its Limits: A 
Comparative Analysis of European Delegation,” Journal of European Public Policy, 
18 (6): 790–809.
trillas, f. [2010a]. “Electricity and Telecoms Reforms in the EU: Insights from the 
Economics of Federalism,” Utilities Policy, 18 (2): 66–76.
trillas, f. [2010b]. “Network Industries and Regulatory Jurisdiction,” IESE Research 
Paper, D/859.
victor, d. G. and hEllEr, t. c. (eds) [2007]. The Political Economy of Power Sector 
Reform: The Experiences of Five Major Developing Countries. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
von hirschhausEn c., ruEstEr, s., Marcantonini, c., hE, X., EGErEr, J. and Glachant, J. 
[2012]. EU Involvement in Electricity and Natural Gas Transmission Grid 
Tarification. Florence: European University Institute. 
WilliaMson, o. E. [1985]. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets and 
Vertical Contracting. New York: Free Press.
WrEn-lEWis, l. [2010]. “Hold-Up Problems in International Electricity Trade,” Mimeo, 
Paris School of Economics.
This content downloaded from 
             164.15.128.33 on Wed, 03 Feb 2021 12:52:17 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
